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COMMENTARIES
AN OKLAHOMA SLANT TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY

RIGHTS
DREW

L. KERSHEN*

Messrs. Sawyer, Huffman, and Echeverria have presented thoughtful, provocative
articles for this symposium on Environmental Protection and the Politics of Property
Rights.' Their ideas are well-presented and timely. Tensions between environmental
protection and property rights have fostered a national debate with significant
implications for the American body politic. This debate needs and deserves the
thoughtfulness and clear articulation that their articles present. Oklahoma too has
an intense, on-going debate about environmental protection and property rights.
In this commentary, I do not intend to reargue the positions that Messrs. Sawyer,
Huffman, and Echeverria have so ably presented in their articles. This commentary
takes a major point from each of the three lead articles and provides an Oklahoma
example illustrating that major point. This commentary attempts to make the ideas
of the lead authors concrete and real for Oklahoma readers by giving an Oklahoma
slant to their articles.
L Andrew Sawyer on the Public Trust
Mr. Sawyer ends his article with speculation about the application of the public
trust to land. However, he concentrates his attention upon water and the dispute
about water rights arising from Mono Lake.2 As I read Mr. Sawyer's argument, he
posits that water is different from land to a significant degree principally because
water is a necessity of life and a shared resource. As a necessity of life, the State
of California has demanded that water be used beneficially, efficiently, and nonwastefully to serve the greatest possible set of interests for the people, animals,
forests, and streams of California. As a shared resource, people think of property
rights in water as a right of use that must be exercised reasonably, without harm,
and with respect for the right of other users, including the fish and other aquatic life
* Earl Sneed Centennial Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. The symposium took place April 26, 1997, in Norman, Oklahoma. The Interdisciplinary Program
on the Environment of the University of Oklahoma funded and sponsored the symposium. Zev
Trachtenberg, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma carried the primary burdens
of organizing this excellent symposium.

The symposium also served as the first collaborative effort between the Oklahoma Bar Association
Real Estate Section and the Oklahoma Law Review. The OBA Section and the Law Review obtained
certification of this symposium as Continuing Legal Education through the University of Oklahoma.
2. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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in the water. For these two reasons, the public trust doctrine is a principle of
stewardship that serves as a background principle of property law against which all
Californians' claims to property rights in water must be understood and evaluated.
As a consequence of the public trust serving as a background principle of
property rights in water, Mr. Sawyer argues powerfully that Los Angeles had a
difficult (if not impossible) task in establishing a Fifth Amendment taking of its
water claims to the Mono Lake. As Mr. Sawyer analyzes the Mono Lake dispute,
the judicial and administrative reconsideration of Los Angeles' claim to Mono Lake
water simply reasserted and reemphasized the background principle of property
law - the public trust - that Los Angeles was trying to ignore.
Unlike California, Oklahoma does not have any judicial, legislative, or
administrative recognition of the public trust doctrine. However, Oklahoma does
have a water law case that on its facts and in its opinion has undertones that are
similar to the Mono Lake case. The Oklahoma case is Franco-American Charolaise,
Ltd v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board.'
In Franco, the City of Ada obtained a prior appropriation water right in Byrd's
Mill Spring on Mill Creek as a municipal water supply from the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board (OWRB). Downstream riparian landowners challenged the water
right because, if Ada exercised the water right, Ada, in many years, would dry up
Mill Creek, thus de-priving the riparian land owners of water flowing past their
lands. The OWRB acted pursuant to a 1963 Oklahoma statute through which the
Oklahoma legislature moved Oklahoma from a mixed system of water rights
(riparian and prior appropriation) to a pure prior appropriation system." In Franco,
the downstream riparians sought a Supreme Court ruling that the 1963 statute
unconstitutionally took their riparian rights to water and, therefore, should be
declared void
The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the downstream riparians. In the 1990
Franco decision, the Court ruled that the 1963 statute was unconstitutional and
void.6 As a consequence of these holdings, the Supreme Court ruled that Ada's
prior appropriation to Byrd's Mill Spring could not trump the downstream riparians'
claims to riparian water rights
Justice Marian Opala wrote the majority opinion for the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Franco.Nowhere in his opinion did Justice Opala use or even mention the
public trust doctrine to support his reasoning. Yet a careful reading of the opinion
leaves the impression that the public trust was floating unseen beneath the majority

3. 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990). The Franco case has a long history dating back to 1980 and is an
active case as of April 1997. The history of the Franco case and essays about its implications for
Oklahoma water law are set forth fully in The Impact of Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma
Water Resources Board, ENVTL. INST. PROJECT REP. (Drew L. Kershen ed., Oklahoma State Univ.,
Stillwater, Okla., Oct. 1995).
4. See 82 OKLA. SrAT. §§ 105.1-105.32 (1991 & Supp. 1996). The statute at 82 OKLA. STAT. §
105.2(D) (1991) is particularly applicable.
5. See Franco,855 P.2d at 570.

6. See id. at 571.
7. See id. at 580.
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opinion's surface. Justice Opala referred favorably several times to California
doctrines and cases as precedent for the prevailing law in Oklahoma.! Justice Opala
emphasized that water rights are use rights that must be exercised reasonably to
protect the interests of others, including potential aesthetic and recreational claims
to water in streams Justice Opala opined for the majority that the OWRB must
maintain a minimum flow in streams for riparian reasonable use that may include
use of the stream for the preservation and support of wildlife." Justice Opala
stated that in some instances that minimum flow required to meet reasonable
riparian needs may well equal the natural flow of the stream."
While the public trust doctrine was an undercurrent in Justice Opala's majority
opinion, Justice Lavender in his concurring and dissenting opinion explicitly
discussed it.' Justice Lavender wrote that the majority had confused public rights
(the public trust) in water with private property rights claimed by riparians. 3
Justice Lavender particularly took issue with riparians being allowed to assert
riparian claims for uncaptured wildlife because uncaptured wildlife are indisputably
public property. 4 In the genteel way that Supreme Court justices write opinions
disagreeing with their colleagues, Justice Lavender seemed to be saying to the
majority that they could not protect the public trust doctrine by reinvigorating the
private property rights regime of riparian water law. Justice Lavender seemed to
challenge the majority to state explicitly and clearly whether the majority recognized
the public trust doctrine as a viable, controlling doctrine for Oklahoma water law.
Justice Opala's majority opinion and Justice Lavender's concurring/dissenting
opinion obviously do not resolve the status of the public trust doctrine in Oklahoma
water law. However, discerning readers of the Francoopinion cannot help but feel
that one day, probably soon, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma will decide a case like
the Mono Lake case. When this occurs, Mr. Sawyer's perceptive discussion of Mono
Lake in this symposium will be relied upon by opposing counsel to shape their
arguments and by the Supreme Court in drafting its opinion. Mr. Sawyer's article
thus is a possible vision of Oklahoma's future.

8. See id. at 571.
9. See id. at 576. In the brief filed on behalf of Franco-American Charolaise, Mr. George Braly
waxes poetic in making claims for riparian uses of water. He argues that riparians have a riparian claim
to cooling water in the stream for the bellies of cattle on hot days and to rippling water in the stream for
dangling toes while boys and girls steal a kiss behind a cottonwood tree. Answer Brief of the Riparian
Landowners/Appellees at 106 n.63, Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd.,
855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990) (No. 59-310). Justice Opala's opinion impliedly makes the OWRB decide
whether "belly cooling" and "dangling toes" claims are reasonable riparian claims to water.

10. See Franco, 855 P.2d at 577.
11. See id. at 578 n.56.
12. See id. at 583. (Lavender, J., concurring, in part and dissenting in part). Although his opinion

is a concurrence and a dissent, Justice Lavender expressed dissenting views to the majority opinion in
all but the last paragraph of his opinion. Justice Lavender discussed the public trust doctrine in the text
accompanying his footnotes 62-64 immediately preceding his last paragraph. See id. at 595. Chief Justice
Hargrave and Special Justice Reif joined Justice Lavender's opinion. See id. at 596.
13. See id. at 583 (Lavender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14. See id. at 595 (Lavender, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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II. James Huffman on Cost Internalizationand Wealth Redistribution
Professor Huffman argues that private property is an inevitable and unavoidable
fact about the allocation of scarce resources. Starting from this fact, he further
contends that private property should not be viewed as antagonistic to environmental
health. Just the opposite, Professor Huffman reasons clearly and forcefully that a
well-defined private property rights regime actually enhances environmental
protection by providing proper incentives to individual behavior and by promoting
the efficient use of resources. Professor Huffman queries rhetorically, does not
American society prefer incentives and efficient resource allocation to forced
obedience and inefficient resource allocations?
Yet despite his rhetorical queries, Professor Huffman shows that in fact private
property rights are often on the defensive, including on the defensive in the debate
between the environmental claims for public rights and property claims for private
rights. He argues that private property rights are forced into this defensive posture
because environmental regulations and claims are as often about wealth distribution
to favored groups Eis these regulations and claims are about cost internalization to
protect the environment. Put simply and bluntly, Professor Huffman contends that
environmental regulations and claims as often redistribute private wealth to special
interests (majoritarian or not) as they benefit the environment. To protect against
this wealth reallocation, Professor Huffman urges a reinvigorated private property
regime and a Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence to redress what should be seen
as legal system failures, not private property-market failures.
Oklahoma echoes of Professor Huffman's insights resonate strongly in the ongoing debate about the proper public policy for Oklahoma's laws and regulations
governing concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). Oklahoma has a
substantial animal feeding industry - catfish farms, cattle feedlots, dairies, poultry
barns, ratite pens, and swine operations. Each of these industries create manures,
dead animals, liquid and solid wastes, and odors that can pollute the water, the air,
and the land of Oklahoma. Each of these industries needs to internalize the cost of
these potential pollutants to protect Oklahoma's environment and to free neighbors
from cost burdens arising from pollution. Protecting the environment and freeing
neighbors from cost burdens seem to be easily identified public policy goals even
if the means to achieve those goals become hotly contested in the public debate.
While the Oklahoma debate about CAFOs has generally kept its focus on the
goals of environmental protection and reasonable land use, wealth redistribution (i.e.
economic advantage and economic protectionism) through environmental regulation
of CAFOs has also been a persistent theme in the public debate. Several examples
exist of wealth redistribution arguments occurring in the Oklahoma debate about the
animal feeding industries.
- Many proponents of stricter environmental laws and regulations for CAFOS are
most bothered by the concentration occurring in the feeding industries. They argue
that CAFOs provide evidence of the corporate takeover of agriculture and of the
industrialization of agriculture. These persons concerned with concentration are
most passionate about the structural issues of agriculture. They want to preserve
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family farms and small-scale animal feeding operations. They want farming and
ranching to be family lifestyles rather than commercial businesses. For those
concerned about the structural issues of agriculture, increased environmental
regulations happily create additional economic entry barriers into animal feeding by
competitors of the preferred structures of family farms and small-scale operations.
• During the debate of spring 1997 about a new Oklahoma law for CAFO
permits, many directed the attention of legislators first and foremost to protecting
particular sectors of the animal feeding industry from the new law. For some
making these arguments that exempt their sector from the new law it would
coincidentally have the beneficial impact of burdening a competing meat. As a
consequence, the new Oklahoma Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Act"
focuses its attention on the swine industry. Most other animal feeding industries
escaped significant additional environmental controls. While the swine industry and
its possible pollution is getting the greatest public attention in Oklahoma, by failing
to keep the debate focused on environmental goals as opposed to wealth distribution
concerns, the new law left unaddressed environmental issues that arise from the
other animal feeding industries. The City of Tulsa is now worried about perceived
threats to its municipal water supply from the poultry industry and demanding that
the law be amended to address the possible pollution arising from poultry barns.'6
Structural issues in agriculture and potential pollution from the swine industry are,
of course, important, complicated public policy issues. But Professor Huffman's
article properly admonishes us that these structural or sector issues should not be
confused with environmental issues. Confusing the issues may do what Professor
Huffman warns against - to use environmental regulations to redistribute wealth
between competitors without necessarily or efficiently protecting the environment.
- Family farms and small-scale animal feeding operations face enormous
economic pressures to survive. If small farms had to comply with additional
environmental legal controls, their operating costs would assuredly rise, which
increases their financial distress. Yet to protect small farms from environmental
controls because of economic concerns allows small farms to continue to pollute.
Moreover, exempting small farms from environmental regulation on the ground that
they do not constitute significant pollution sources is to act on an assumption that
may often be incorrect.' 7
Professor Huffman's insights apply to small farm pollution. If small farms
pollute, environmental regulations that are truly oriented toward the environment

15. 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws. ch. 331, § 1-21 (codified at 2 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-201 to 9-215
(West Supp. 1997). The Oklahoma House and Oklahoma Senate passed the Act on May 23 and May

27, 1997 respectively. Gov. Frank Keating signed the Act on May 28, 1997. The new law, which
became effective September 1, 1997, amends and replaces the Oklahoma Feed Yards Act, 2 OKLA. STAT.

§§ 9-201 to 9-215 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Mick Hinton, Task Force Mulls Messy Problem of Chicken Waste, DAlLy OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 21, 1997, at 1.

17. The Kiplinger Agriculture Letter recently reported that the Environmental Protection Agency is
working on an environmental enforcement strategy for some non-CAFO animal feeding operations that
would take effect in 1998. See KIPLINGER AGRIC. LETrER, Aug. 15, 1997, at 2.
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would make the smell farms internalize these costs. If the environmental regulations
exempt small farms from internalizing environmental costs, Professor Huffman's
article alerts us to the possibility that this environmental regulation may only
redistribute wealth (by imposing additional costs on non-exempt farm operations)
without achieving significant environmental protection. From Professor Huffman's
articulated position, creating environmental costs on certain actors without
substantially protecting the environment causes a tragic waste both of economic
resources and environmental resources.
III. John Echeverria on the Politics of Property Rights
Mr. Echeverria gives an insightful and thorough history of the property rights
movement as a political phenomenon for the past decade in the states, the Supreme
Court, the federal executive branch, and the 104th and 105th Congresses. He
stresses the significant impact the property rights movement has had recently due
to a cohesive, well-financed campaign rooted in libertarian ideology and backed
with strategic canpaign contributions. He argues that the property rights movement
has created a public mythology that portrays environmental laws and regulations as
adversely affecting the small landowner - the little guy being pummeled by the
anonymous bureaucrat. As a consequence of this public mythology, Mr. Echeverria
shows that the property rights movement, while often unable to sustain its own
legislative proposals, has effectively stymied the reauthorization of major
environmental acts and squelched new environmental initiatives.
From his vantage, Mr. Echeverria sees the public mythology as both the strongest
and weakest link in the property rights movement. He responds to the property
rights mythology by arguing for a counter-mythology that has three emphases:
individual rights to environmental protection by empowering citizens to protect their
established property uses either through nuisance suits or participatory regulatory
procedures; the historical fact of public ownership of certain natural resources such
as the public lands and wildlife; and, the dissemination of factual information about
land distribution patterns to educate the public about who benefits and who loses
if the property right movement succeeds in its agenda. Mr. Echeverria hopes that
these three emphasss will lead to a rethinking of private property rights. Mr.
Echeverria contends that a rethinking of private property rights would result in a
broader, deeper understanding that private property rights are always subject to a
very substantial conmunitarian trusteeship.
Mr. Echeverria's first counter-point to the property rights movement - empowering private citizens to protect established property uses from environmental
degradation - has become constitutional law in the state of Oklahoma. Indeed,
Oklahoma may be a sterling example for Mr. Echeverria to use to illustrate his first
counter-point.
When the Oklahoma Department of Health granted a license for a landfill,
neighboring property owners sued the Department. They alleged that their due
process rights in protecting their property interests would be violated unless the
Department took two actions: gave appropriate notice to the neighbors of the
pending license application, and granted a "trial-type" hearing for the neighbors to
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contest the license prior to issuing it. In DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Department
of Health," the Supreme Court of Oklahoma agreed with the neighboring
landowners. The Supreme Court ruled that the state would be perilously close to
taking private property without due process if the Department granted a license
without notice to and a hearing for neighboring property owners." In effect, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma used the due process clause to grant owners of
established property uses a constitutionally-based nuisance action" that the
legislature may not erode through regulatory regimes, such as the one in DuLaney,
controlling landfill siting.2
As Oklahomans have debated the appropriate governmental regulation of
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), the implications of DuLaney have
become apparent. For years, the Oklahoma State Department of Agriculture
(OSDA) granted licenses to CAFOs through a process internal to OSDA - an
internal administrative review of the application. As the debate over CAFOs became
more heated, landowners neighboring proposed CAFOs petitioned OSDA for the
same notice and hearing rights as those granted the neighboring landowners in
DuLaney.' In November 1996, the Attorney General issued an opinion that
directed OSDA to provide notice to neighboring landowners on all applications and
a "trial-like" administrative hearing when the neighboring landowners can present
specific factual allegations that the proposed feedlot may have a "direct, immediate
and substantial harm" upon their property. ' Within a few months of the Attorney
General's opinion, OSDA promulgated an administrative rule providing for notice
and hearings in CAFO applications.' Similarly, the Oklahoma legislature enacted
a provision mandating notice and hearings in CAFO applications in the new
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Act.'
For Oklahomans who opposed land uses that they believe will cause environmental degradation, the DuLaney case and the OSDA experience with CAFO licenses
provide clear victories for their right to have notice of the license application and
their right to contest that application through an adversarial administrative hearing.
Oklahomans thus have what Mr. Echeverria suggests for adoption at the federal
level - individual citizens empowered to protect their established property uses

18. 868 P.2d 676 (Okla. 1993).
19. See id. at 681.
20. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 97-30 (May 5, 1997) (holding that OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23
creates an independent cause of action for taking or damaging property).
21. See DuLaney, 868 P.2d at 678. See generallyBrent M. Johnson, Note, EnvironmentalLaw: Are
Oklahoma Environmental Permits Valid under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause?
DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Dep't of Health, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 651 (1995) (arguing that the Dulaney
decision has potentially a far-reaching impact to invalidate many license procedures existing within the
state government of Oklahoma).
22. Objection to Issuance of License, In Re Application of Top Farm, Inc. (Mar. 25, 1966).
23. Okla. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 96-76, at 16 (Nov. 1, 1996).
24. See License Application for New Facilities or Expanding Operations, Okla. Agric. Admin. Rule
35:15-43-6 (June 26, 1997), 14 Okla.Reg. 2450 (1997).

25. See Oklahoma Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Act, 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 331,
§ 7 (to be codified at 2 OKLA. STAT. § 9-205.1) (signed by Governor Frank Keating on May, 28, 1997).
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from developments that may cause environmental harms.' Oklahomans have
'individual rights of a constitutional dimension to environmental protection.
Conclusion
This symposium has been graced with three excellent lead articles filled with
provocative insights. Readers can learn much from each of these articles. With this
commentary, the author hopes that readers also have an appreciation for the fact that
the ideas presented in these lead articles have Oklahoma counterparts. The articles
of this symposium are thus more than provocative; they are timely and useful to
every Oklahoman engaged in the public debate about environmental protection and
the politics of property rights.

26. In his article, Mr. Echeverria specifically mentions the Homeowners Empowerment and
Protection Act, S. 2070, 104th Cong. (1996), a bill introduced by Senators Wyden and Warner.
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